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Practicing secular law,' a not altogether uncommon career
choice among Jews,2 presents perilous predicaments from the
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., Princeton
University, 1974; J.D., Yale Law School, 1978; Rabbinic Degree, Beth
Medrash Govoha, 1983; Chair, Section on Jewish Law, Association of
American Law Schools. I express my gratitude to the DePaul University
College of Law for the Spring 1998 research leave that enabled me to study
and write about Jewish legal ethics, as well as other aspects of Jewish law. I
hope to follow up this article with a more particularized analysis of how
Jewish law would approach various ethical dilemmas. I very much appreciate
the kind support and encouragement I have consistently received from Dean
Teree Foster and former Dean John Roberts. I especially thank my dear
friend, Rabbi Aaron Small, with whom I studied a number of relevant texts,
for his perceptive insights and suggestions. I also thank Ira Kasdan, Esq. and
Professors Rodney Blackman, Michael Broyde, Samuel J. Levine and Russell
Pearce for their helpful comments. Although Michael Broyde and I have long
disagreed about the religious dilemmas confronting a Jewish attorney (I
continue to think he substantially underestimates them), I value our many
intellectual exchanges.
Given the intricacy and resiliency of Jewish law, and the delicacy of the
questions confronted, this Article should in no way be regarded as providing
authoritative Jewish law rulings for actual cases. Persons with such questions
should personally and carefully consult with a competent Jewish law authority.
I Many of the ethical issues discussed in this paper arise in connection with
other commercial activities as well and are not endemic to the legal profession.
In fact, I look forward to the possibility of exploring these issues in other
contexts. Nevertheless, lawyering provides a useful setting in which to
examine these matters. First, because secular law provides ethical rules that
regulate lawyers, one can compare and contrast the different approaches taken
by the secular and Jewish legal systems. Second, many aspects of secular
lawyering specifically involve convincing an adversary, a jury or a judge of
"facts" that a lawyer may believe to be false. Indeed, law schools - especially
through their trial advocacy programs - train people to develop precisely these
types of skills. I do not know whether educational programs that prepare
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perspective of Jewish law (halakha). Halakha does not explicitly
bar Jews from becoming secular lawyers. Indeed, lawyers can
importantly promote Jewish interests. For example, they can
defend individuals from physical, financial, or psychological
oppression, they can protect children in family disputes, and they
can advance communal interests by representing organizations
committed to Jewish priorities.4
Nonetheless, various Jewish law values powerfully militate
against the acceptance of certain matters or the use of specific
strategies or conventions. Among other things, Jewish law
opposes actions that unfairly harm third parties, that cast the
Jewish faith in a falsely unflattering light, or that, because of the
actions' spiritually corrosive character, eat away at the intrinsic
holiness of the Jewish actor and, indirectly, of the entire Jewish
people. Furthermore, as discussed below, Jewish law
affirmatively requires an attorney to take some steps that, though
morally correct, may be inconsistent with secular regulations.
Such rules surely complicate, if not preclude, certain lawyering
activities.
2 It has not, however, always been a common career for religiously observant
Jews. See generally BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR
OUR TIMEs 91-120 (1984); MICHAEL J. BROYDE, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
AND JEWISH LAW 5-8 (1996); Dov Frimer, The Role of a Lawyer in Jewish
Law, I J. LAW & RELIGION 297 (1983).
3 Rabbi Hayam Halevy Donin aptly describes the term halakha:
Halakha is the overall term for Jewish law ... Halakha is practical,
not theoretical. Halakha is legal, not philosophical . . . Halakha
asks for a commitment in behavior. It deals with ethical obligations
and religious duties . . . [H]alakha covers every aspect and
relationship of life, whether it be between man and man or between
man and G-d. Thus the halakha concerns itself not only with those
areas that are generally regarded as being in the realm of ritual and
religion, but also with those areas that are generally assigned by
non-Jewish scholars to the spheres of morality and ethics, or to civil
and criminal law.
See HAYAM HALEVY DONIN, To BE A JEW 29 (1972).
' Lawyers can advance these interests in a variety of ways, such as by
drafting model legislation as well as by providing legal counseling and, in
appropriate cases, litigative services.
2
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Jewish law offers a sophisticated approach to legal ethics. It
recognizes a hierarchy of values, 5 and, in appraising an action in
' Jewish law importantly differentiates between biblical commandments,
which are those deemed to have been directly transmitted by the Creator to
Moses, and non-biblical rules. There are various sources of non-biblical law,
including rabbinic law and custom. See generally MENACHEi ELON,
MISHPAT IVRI (1988); H.CHAIM SCHIMMEL, THE ORAL LAW (1996).
Interestingly, Jewish law does not recognize the literal meaning of a verse in
the bible, the Torah, as the authoritative statement of biblical law. Indeed,
some verses, taken literally, are incomprehensible. For example, the Torah
states that on the holiday of Succot, referred to by some as the "Feast of
Tabernacles," one must perform a ritual involving the waving of certain
plants. One of these is referred to as a pri etz hadar, which literally means a
"fruit of the glorious tree." The Torah does not otherwise specify what type
of tree is meant. The oral tradition explains that the verse refers to a particular
citron, the etrog. Similarly, the Torah uses certain terms without providing
their full legal content. For instance, the Torah states that one may not do
melakha ("work") on the Sabbath, see, e.g., Exodus 31:14, or on certain other
occasions, but does not clarify what does or does not constitute "work." In
addition, although the Torah requires ritual slaughtering of certain animals
before their meat may be eaten, nowhere does the written text describe the
slaughtering process. Instead, it simply states that animals are to be
slaughtered "as I have instructed you," Deuteronomy, 12:21, implying that
detailed directions had been previously transmitted orally. For a fuller
discussion of this topic, see H.CHAIM SCHIMMEL, THE ORAL LAW 19-
31(1996); BARUKH EPSTEIN, TORAH TEMIMAH, on Deuteronomy 12:21.
Instead, Jewish law maintains that an oral tradition transmitted to Moses both
amplified and interpreted the written Torah. See Menachem Elon, supra, at
1:179. This oral tradition not only contains specific laws and information but
also hermeneutical rules of interpretation. Id. at 270; ARYEH KAPLAN, THE
HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 181. According to Jewish tradition, there are
a variety of purposes, unrelated to our present subject, for the creation of
complementary written and oral traditions. See ARYEH KAPLAN, supra, at
178-81, see also MAIMONIDES, INTRODUCTION TO THE MISHNAH; ARYEH
KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 178-181. There are various
approaches as to whether the entire body of biblical laws was communicated to
Moses at Sinai. One position is that the written and oral traditions provided at
that time conveyed all of the minutiae of Jewish law. A second view is that
proper human authorities were authorized to render new interpretations or
applications of Jewish law Which have biblical status. According to one school
of thought, only innovations consistent with the original intent of the Divine
Lawgiver are valid, while another approach validates even innovations that
differ from such original intent. See AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN
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a specific scenario, considers a wide range of variables.6 It offers
a spectrum of nuanced responses and does not merely require or
prohibit particular actions. Instead, Jewish law often encourages
or discourages conduct and even offers various degrees of
LAW (1991), at xxi-xxiv (asserting that there is a third view as well).
Nevertheless, both traditions are sources for rules of biblical status. By
contrast, non-biblical rules arise from various origins, such as rabbinic edicts,
communal legislation and custom.
6 For example, in determining whether a person is required to take a
particular action, Jewish law usually considers the cost of compliance.
Biblical commandments are either characterized as affirmative or negative.
Although Jewish law requires that one forfeit all of one's wealth to avoid
violation of a negative commandment, see SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah
157:1, most authorities maintain that it requires one to expend no more than
20% of one's wealth to fulfill any one affirmative commandment. See
SHULHAN ARUKH, Orah Hayyim 656:1.
There is an interesting split of authority as to what determines whether a
particular commandment is categorized as affirmative or negative for purposes
of this rule. According to one view, the relevant biblical language is decisive.
If the verse which is the source of a commandment directs that one should do
something, the commandment is an affirmative one. If the verse directs that
one should not do something, the commandment is a negative one. The
alternative position ignores the form of the biblical language and asks, instead,
whether a violation of the commandment involves malfeasance or nonfeasance.
If a commandment can be violated without doing any act (i.e., if a violation is
one of nonfeasance), the commandment in effect affirmatively requires
conduct, and there is no need to expend all of one's wealth to avoid a passive
violation. On the other hand, if a commandment can only be violated actively
(i.e., through malfeasance), one must avoid a transgression even at the cost of
one's entire fortune. See generally AKIVA EGER, HIDUSHEI RABBI AKIVA
EGER, SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 157:1.
These two approaches would render opposite results with respect to a
commandment arising out of a verse stating [d]on't be passive as to X. The
first view would have no difficulty designating this as a negative
commandment. The second view, however, would characterize this as an
affirmative commandment, because, by proscribing passivity, the verse
requires action. This commandment could be violated by inaction.
Various authorities believe that the obligation to expend or sacrifice all of
one's wealth to avoid violation of a negative biblical commandment applies to
the avoidance of rabbinic prohibitions as well, such as the mesayeah rule
discussed infra. See, e.g., SHLOMO YEHUDA, EREKH SHAI, HOSHEN MISHPAT
26.
4
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encouragement or discouragement. Expressions of such
sentiments are not mere homiletic exercises. They are articulated
in legal codices and they sometimes trigger formal action by
rabbinical courts! Indeed, the nature of Jewish law is that it is a
24-hour a day, 7-day a week religion with prescribed rules for
virtually every activity.9 A Jew is not entitled to separate her
7 Interestingly, many of the practical differences between those rules that
Jewish law requires and those that it strongly encourages have become blurred
because, at least outside of Israel - and perhaps even in Israel - there are
relatively few effective mechanisms for enforcing Jewish law (as opposed to
Israeli secular law) against anyone who does not voluntarily submit to its
dictates.
' These various positions can be illustrated in the context of a promise to sell
goods. Usually Jewish law neither encourages nor discourages someone from
making such a commercial promise. If, however, one makes such a promise
and it is accompanied by the proper legal formality (a kinyan), then
performance is required. Mere receipt of the purchase price for an item is not
a sufficient legal formality under Jewish law's internal rules to make a promise
obligatory; a promissor may disavow such a "deal" by returning the funds
received. Nevertheless, non-performance is strongly discouraged. A
promissor who backs out of a sale by returning the purchase price is required
to appear in Jewish court, and the court pronounces a curse on him. Jewish
law authorities cite two substantially similar versions of the curse, each of
which includes the statement that "He who exacted retribution from the
generation of the Flood, will punish those who do not stand by their word."
Even where there is neither fulfillment of the appropriate formality nor receipt
of the purchase price, failure to perform is discouraged. About a person who
fails to perform in such circumstances, the standard Code of Jewish law states
that "the Sages are not pleased with him" and that "his trustworthiness" is
wanting. See SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 204:7. See also
BABYLONAN TALMUD, Bava Metsia 49a. Of course, if the promise itself was
to do something prohibited by Jewish law, performance of the promise is
proscribed.
Secular law can also be perceived as favoring or disfavoring conduct through
the provision of tax incentives or tax disincentives. Nevertheless, the purposes
for tax rules are not always clear. Governments may impose them simply to
generate revenue.
9 As Rabbi Donin points out:
[The Jewish religion is all-encompassing. There are no areas in the
realm of human behavior with which it does not deal or offer
guidance. To the extent that every aspect of life is regarded a
subject to the guidelines established by the halakha, one cannot
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existence into discrete personal and professional lives; the same
religious guidelines govern business as well as private conduct.'0
Identifying applicable Jewish laws, and correctly appreciating
their impact, is critical to diverse constituencies. Jews
contemplating law as a vocation can only effectively evaluate
their options if they realize the restrictions under which they
would function." Current members of the bar must master the
rules in order to comply with them and to circumvent avoidable
problems. 12  Jewish institutions that operate law schools may
desire to learn about these issues so as to incorporate them, in
whole or in part, in their legal ethics and advocacy offerings. 3
More generally, academics, by exploring the rules Jewish law
one of life's many compartments, or that it is separate and distinct
from other areas of one's life and concern. A person's eating
habits, his sex life, his business ethics, his social activities, his
entertainment, his artistic expression are all under the umbrella of
religious law, of the religious values and the spiritual guidelines of
Judaism. Jewish religion does not disassociate itself from any
aspect of life, and does not confine its concern only to ritual acts
that have a mystical significance within a supernatural world. Fully
and properly observed, the Jewish religion is life itself, and provides
values to guide all of life.
See HAYIM HALEVY DONIN, To BE A JEW 29-30 (1972).
"0 See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer:
Integrating Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1199 (1996).
" Jewish law sometimes imposes a prior restrictions that do not apply to
those who have already placed themselves at financial risk. Consequently,
even though Jewish law might not require an attorney to change his profession
or even to change his area of specialization once he has invested in them,
Jewish law may strongly discourage a person from becoming an attorney or
from focusing on certain types of practice.
12 By becoming more knowledgeable about how Jewish law and secular law
interact, Jewish attorneys may also be able to provide more effective services
to religiously observant Jewish clients. Such a client may not be well served
even if he successfully obtains a secular judgment, if the client later discovers
that Jewish law does not permit him to enforce the judgment.
"3 Of course, even if Jewishly affiliated schools desired to include such
materials into their curricula, especially into their legal ethics courses, it would
be interesting whether professors at such institutions - especially those who are
not Jewish or, if Jewish, are not religiously observant Jews - would oppose
this goal by asserting academic freedom claims.
[Vol 15
6
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places on attorneys, can better perceive Jewish law's sensitivity to
practical realities and ethics and can observe the interrelationship
between the secular and Jewish legal systems.'
4
For various reasons, many people are either uninformed or
misinformed regarding this topic. First, there are relatively few
relevant publications. 5 Second, perhaps because their authors
lack adequate training in Jewish law, some writings display
insufficient knowledge of Jewish law doctrine, literature, 6 and
hierarchies of authority. 7 Third, a few pieces, while written by
persons trained in Jewish law, seem, at times, to be polemical or
'4 For similar studies, see, e.g., Michael J. Broyde and Steven H. Resnicoff,
Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The Corporate Paradigm, 43
WAYNE L. REV. 1685 (1997); Steven H. Resnicoff, Bankruptcy Lav - A
Viable Halachic Option?, 24 HALACHA & CoNTEMP. SOC'Y 5 (Fall 1992);
Steven H. Resnicoff, A Commercial Conundrum: Does Prudence Permit the
Jewish "Permissible Venture"?, 20 SETON HALL L. REv. 77 (1990).
"5 For English publications on Jewish law and lawyering, see Hilary R.
Kastleman, Selected Bibliography: Religion and Lmayering, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1643, 1649-1651 (1998); BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND
HALAKHAH FOR OuR TnmEs 91-120 (1984). For non-Hebrew articles on
Jewish law, generally, see NAHUM RAKOVER, THE MULTILANGUAGE
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JEWISH LAW (1990); PHYLLIS HOLMAN WEISBARD, JEWSH
LAW: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES AND SCHOLARSHIP IN ENGLISH (1989); J.
DAvID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS, Volumes 1-4. See
also the Jewish law web site sponsored by the Orthodox Union,
<http://www.JL.com. >.
6 In addition to training in Jewish law, some authors lack the language skills,
in Hebrew and Babylonian Aramaic, that are necessary to analyze primary
resources. This inability, in turn, cripples their efforts to critically evaluate
secondary works written in English. To accurately assess such secondary
works, one must be able to appreciate the content and context of the primary
sources to which they refer and on which they rely.
"7 Consequently, some of these articles seem to discuss the authors'
perceptions of how Jewish "values" or "tradition" - as the authors understand
them - apply to lawyering, see Russell G. Pearce, The Jeish Lai,'er's
Question, 27 Tsx. TECH L. REv. 1259 (1996) (discussing such literature),
rather than to analyze how Jewish law views, or interacts with, secular
lawyering. Unfortunately, because of their easy "accessibility" to other
modem writers, these articles are often cited and tend to acquire a distorted
appearance of importance. This lamentable result is exacerbated by the fact
that many legitimate Jewish law authorities do not publicly express their views
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misleading.' Finally,' 9 the multifarious aspects of legal practice -
and the staggering number and complexity of attendant Jewish
law issues - make it difficult to treat this topic comprehensively.
's As an example, I take issue with the work of my friend, Michael Broyde
which, among other things, seems to focus very heavily on what Jewish law
mandates and forbids, rather than on what it favors or disfavors and to spend a
disproportionate amount of text on lenient views while either ignoring or
relegating to footnotes more restrictive views, even those held by preeminent
authorities. See MICHAEL BROYDE, supra note 2. Consequently, a reader of
Broyde's work may believe that Broyde is providing definitive
characterizations of the views of various Jewish law authorities and providing
conclusions about Jewish law that are generally accepted. Nevertheless, I
believe that such a conclusion would be unfounded. The views of the Jewish
law authorities Broyde cites are often considerably more complex than he
suggests, and his conclusions are far more uncertain than he implies.
Although this is not the place for a thorough analysis of Broyde's book, two
interrelated examples, regarding the doctrines of lifnei iver and mesayeah,
should be instructive. Discussed, infra, in Part I, these rules, which prohibit
enabling or assisting others to violate Jewish law, are fundamentally important
to an evaluation of Jewish legal ethics.
Broyde states that Maimonides' view is that whenever a Jew aids another to
violate Jewish law, the aider violates a biblical rather than rabbinic
prohibition, even if the violation could have been accomplished without the
aid. Id. at 58. Biblical violations are generally regarded as more serious than
rabbinic ones. Broyde then says that, "[A]mong the latter commentaries, it
appears that only a single decisor accepts as normative the approach of
Maimonides," and, to support this contention, cites YAIR HAYYIM BACHRACH,
HAVVOT YAIR 137. However, HAVVOT YAIR 137 deals with a different matter
altogether. Moreover, in HAVVOT YAIR 185, Rabbi Bachrach states, as part of
his rationale in a particular case, that where a violation could have been
accomplished without the aider's assistance, "everyone agrees" that the aider's
own violation is no more than rabbinic. Thus, Rabbi Bachrach does not agree
with Maimonides' view, as Broyde describes it. Although a mistake as to a
particular authority's view can be overlooked, this error regarding Rabbi
Bachrach's view is more difficult to understand because his view and/or his
responsum 185 is prominently cited by authorities addressing this subject.
See, e.g., Zvi HIRSCH EISENSTADT, PrTHEI TESHUVA, Yoreh De'ah 151;
AVRAHAM SHMUEL BINYAMIN SOFER, KETAV SOFER, Yoreh De'ah 83;
YITZHAK WEISS, MINHAT YITZHAK 111:79(6); MESHULAM RATH, KOL
MEVASSER 1:48; SHLOMO MORDECHAI SCHVADRON, SHUT MAHARSHAM
VI: 11; YEHUDA ASSAD, YEHUDA YA'ALEH 1, Yoreh De'ah 177.
Another problem arises in connection with Broyde's discussion of the view
of Rabbi Moshe Isserles (Rema), a major Jewish law authority, who authored
8
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several commentaries, including one on SHULHAN ARUKH, a standard
codification of Jewish law. At one point, SHULHAN ARUKH discusses whether
it is permissible to sell to non-Jews items they may use in their religious
practices. SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 151:1. Rema states that, if the
non-Jews could anyway obtain the items elsewhere, there is a split of opinion.
One view permits the sale, while a second view opposes the sale. Rema then
comments "Our custom is to act according to the first [lenient] opinion, [but] a
pious person should act strictly [i.e., in accordance with the second view]."
Apparently summarizing this comment, Broyde states: "[i]t is permitted to aid
another person in sinning if others will do so if the prospective facilitator does
not" (Tosafot and Rema)." See MICHAEL J. BROYDE, supra note 2, at 59.
Broyde says the same thing in an article by Michael Broyde and David
Hertzberg, Enabling a Jew to Sin: the Parameters, J. HALACHA & CONTFMP.
SOC'Y 19:7, 16 (Spring 1990). In yet another article, On the Practice of Law
According to Halacha, J. HALACHA & CONTmP. SOC'Y 20:5, 12 (Fall 1990).
Broyde makes the point even more clearly: "Thus, the Ramo [i.e., Rema]
states that any time others (perhaps even only other Jews [footnote omitted]
can aid one in the commission of a sin, an observant Jew can do so as well,
because no additional sinning occurs." Id.
As to Rena, Broyde's "summary" is troublesome. First, in a responsum,
Rema explicitly rules that helping a Jew to sin, even when the person helped
would commit the sin without the help, is rabbinically prohibited. See MOSHE
ISSERLES, SHUT REMA 52. This responsum is cited, for example, in SHLOMO
YEHUDA, EREKH SHAI, HOSHEN MISHPAT 26.
Second, in another of his works, DARKEi MOSHE HAARuKH, Rema explains
that the lenient custom to sell Gentiles items they would use in their religious
practices developed because the religious practices of Gentiles had changed
and were no longer idolatrous. As a result, when performed by Gentiles, these
practices no longer violated Jewish law. Yoreh De'ah 151. In light of this
explanation, Rema's requirement that a pious person refrain from selling such
items, even when a sale would not contribute to an actual violation of Jewish
law, appears relatively stringent. It is not at all inconsistent with his ruling in
SHUT REMA 52 involving assistance to one who is actually violating Jewish
law.
Indeed, Rabbi Shabtai HaKohen (Shakh), an important authority on the
SHULHAm ARuKH whose commentary is printed on the same page of SHULHAN
ARuKH as the Rema's, reminds us why, according to Rema, the lenient custom
developed. SHABTAI HAKoHEN, SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 151, sif
koton 7. Presumably, Shakh's purpose is to imply that Rema would rule more
strictly in cases involving the facilitation of real halakhic violations. Rabbi
Bachrach, mentioned above, cites Shakh and states that Rema would
presumably rule stringently in other cases. HAVVOT YAIR 185. Rabbi Zvi
Hirsch Eisenstadt, another commentator whose work, PrrHF! TESHUVA, is
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In recognition of this last point, the purview of this preliminary
paper will be limited. It will not address issues arising either
from the practice of criminal law or from standard business
procedures."0 Rather, its modest goal will be to provide a
excerpts this portion of HAVVOT YAIR 185 and does not disagree with it.
Many other authorities similarly construe Shakh as stating that the Rema only
referred to a lenient custom regarding Gentile religious practices. See, e.g.,
MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Orah Hayyim 111:27; AvRAHAM SHMUEL
BINYAMIN SOFER, KETAV SOFER, Yoreh De'ah 83; AHARON KOTLER, SHUT
MISHNAT RAV AHARON 1:3.
Of course, Broyde could suggest that Rema's statement about a lenient
custom might apply even where there is a real violation of Jewish law. See,
e.g., YOSEF ISSER, SHAAR MISHPAT, Hoshen Mishpat 26:1. What is
problematic is Broyde's failure to mention that Shakh and HAVVOT YAIR 185
(and, apparently, PITHEI TESHUVA) - whose views appear on the same page of
SHULHAN ARUKH as Rema's opinion - would apparently disagree with such a
suggestion.
I want to emphasize that, in this essay, I am not saying that the Rema's
position is beyond debate. For example, HAVVOT YAIR 185, who states that
Rema's comment about the lenient custom was limited, nonetheless points to a
subtlety in Rema's immediately preceding words and suggests that, irrespective
of the question of custom, Rema may have been personally inclined toward the
lenient view. In any event, Shakh does not make this observation and PITHEI
TESHUVA does not cite this part of HAVVOT YAIR, signifying, perhaps, that
they did not regard the subtlety to be important. Nor is it mentioned by
Rabbis Sofer, Kotler or Feinstein, who seem to say that, according to Shakh,
Rema would rule strictly where an actual Jewish law violation is involved.
See, e.g., MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Orah Hayyim 111:27;
AVRAHAM SHMUEL BINYAMIN SOFER, KETAV SOFER, Yoreh De'ah 83;
AHARON KOTLER, SHUT MISHNAT RAV AHARON 1:3. Finally, Rema's position
in SHUT REMA 52 - while possibly unavailable to some earlier scholars, is
available to contemporary academics - is clear.
" The items listed in the text are not intended as an exclusive enumeration of
relevant factors. For example, an additional problem is the fact that many
leading Jewish lawyers, for various reasons, may only render their opinions
orally and privately. At the same time, lesser authorities may publish their
views publicly. Because academics may feel obligated to address the relevant
published work, the views of such lesser authorities may be given undue
prominence.
20 Those interested in these subjects may want to refer to tapes from a
conference, The Legal Profession Today: A Torah Perspective, sponsored in
New York on November 5, 1989, by Agudath Israel of America. These tapes
10
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framework for exploring two chief concerns associated with the
practice of civil law. Part I focuses on the goals of
representation. Assuming that the means used are permissible,
Part I asks whether Jewish law discourages an attorney from
assisting someone in accomplishing ends that violate Jewish law.
By contrast, Part II asks whether Jewish law discourages the
employment of particular means even if the ends are consistent
with Jewish law.2" A future paper is planned to focus in detail on
a variety of specific legal ethics questions."
PART I - ASSISTING SOMEONE TO VIOLATE JEWISH
LAW
Secular law often influences Jewish law. For example, Jewish
law recognizes commercial customs as a source of law. 23 In
may be available from Agudath Israel, 84 William Street, New York, New
York.
2 Although secular legal ethics codes, subject to certain exceptions, do not
recognize an interrelationship between ends and means, Jewish law, just as
some secular ethical systems, does. Nevertheless, this topic is beyond our
present scope.
2- In addition to exploring in greater depth the issues raised in this Article, a
future paper may focus on topics such as (1) the common scenarios in which a
secularly legitimate goal may in fact violate Jewish law; and (2) the conditions
under which a Jewish attorney may or may not: (a) represent a client in a
secular court; or (b) represent the prosecution or defense in a criminal
proceeding. As to this last issue, see, e.g., Michael 1. Broyde, Practicing
Criminal Law: A Jewish Lnv Analysis of Being a Prosecutor or Defense
Attorney, 66 FORD. L. REv. 1141 (1998).
23 See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Mersia 83a. See also ISAAC
HERZOG, THE MAIN INsTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW (1965); MENACHEM ELON,
THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAw (1975), col. 97; SHMUEL DI MEDINA, SHUT
MAHARASHDAM 108 (the questioner makes this argument, and Maharashdam
comments approvingly); DAVID CHAZAN, NIDIv LEV 12; YISROEL AVRAHAM
ALTER LANDAU, BErr YISROEL 172. A commercial custom may be binding
under Jewish law even if a majority of the merchants who established the
custom were not Jewish, and even if the custom was established as a result of
secular legislation. See MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Hoshen Mishpar
1:72; YOSEF IGGERES, DIVPEi YOSEF 21 (stating that this is the view of the
Rambam and the Rashba); YEHIEL M. EPSTEIN, ARuKH HASHULHAN, Hoshen
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addition, as to some matters, Jewish law applies secular law to
transactions among Jews, pursuant to a doctrine known as "the
law of the land is valid law" (dina demalkhuta dina).4
Furthermore, Jewish law recognizes secular law as the proper
basis on which to adjudicate disputes between non-Jews. 5
generally Steven H. Resnicoff, Bankruptcy - A Viable Halachic Option?, 24 J.
HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y 5 (1992).
24 See generally SHMUEL SHILO, DINE DE'MALKHUTA DINA (1974); DAYAN
I. GRUNFELD, THE JEWISH LAW OF INHERITANCE 17-46 (1987); R. Hershel
Schacter, "Dina De'malchusa Dina": Secular Law As a Religious Obligation, I
J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y 103 (1981); Steven H. Resnicoff,
Bankruptcy - A Viable Halachic Option?, 21 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y
5 (1992); ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDIT, dina de'malkhuta; OVADIA YOSEF,
YIHAVE DA'AT IV:65; ELIEZER WALDENBURG, TzITz ELIEZER XVI:49;
MOSHE TEITELBAUM, HEISHIV MOSHE 90. See also Aaron Kirschenbaum &
Jon Trafimow, The Sovereign Power of the State: A Proposed Theory of
Accommodation in Jewish Law, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 925 (1991); Chaim
Povarsky, Jewish Law v. the Law of the State: Theories of Accommodation, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 941 (1991).
25 Jewish law provides that non-Jews must abide by seven basic categories of
law, known as the "Noahide laws", apply to non-Jews. One of these
obligations is to establish a judicial system. Most Jewish law authorities
believe that this authorizes non-Jews to establish laws that differ from the
Jewish laws that govern transactions that are only between Jews. See, e.g.,
MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:10; OVADIA YOSEF,
YEHAVEH DA'AT 4:65; YITZHAK WEISS, MINHAT YITZHAK 4:52:3 (citing
authorities); MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Hoshen Mishpat 11:62. See
also Nahum Rakover, Jewish Law and the Noahide Obligation to Preserve
Social Order, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1073, 1098-1118, and App. I & 11 (1991).
Sometimes secular law may even apply to transactions between Jews and
non-Jews. The Talmud discusses a case in which a non-Jewish creditor asserts
a claim against a Jewish debtor. It says that if, in such a case, the creditor
would lose according to secular law, the rabbinic court tells the creditor "Such
and such is the result according to your law, and we adjudicate your claim
accordingly. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Kama 113a. Maimonides
interprets this to mean that secular law applies in disputes between Jews and
non-Jews, whether the secular law favors or disfavors the Jewish litigant. See
MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:12. Most
commentators, however, believe that secular law only applies when it favors
the Jewish litigant. See, e.g., MOSHE STERNBUCH, TESHUVOT VIHANHAGOT
1:795.
12
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Nevertheless, these doctrines do not always operate to alter
Jewish law's internal rules. 26 Consequently, Jewish law and
secular law will in many cases differ, and, not infrequently, a
client's goal may violate Jewish law. In litigation, a plaintiff may
desire a monetary judgment even though Jewish law finds the
defendant blameless or, if liable, responsible for less than the
sum sought. Alternatively, a defendant may seek to avoid a
judgment when Jewish law would obligate him to pay. Similarly,
a client's goal may be to obtain a secular court order authorizing
him to violate Jewish laws regarding child custody or bioethics.'
In transactional matters, a prospective client may want to
consummate a loan involving prohibited interest or write a will
disinheriting one of his children.' Where a client's goal violates
Jewish law, should a Jewish attorney represent such a client?
Until Part II, we will assume that the means the attorney would
utilize are themselves inoffensive. The issue is whether the
attorney should refuse the matter simply because of the client's
objective.
Secular law's approach seems fairly clear: an attorney generally
cannot counsel or assist a client in conduct that the attorney
knows is, according to secular law, criminal or fraudulent."
Jewish law is considerably more complex.
26 Exploring these limits would exceed the scope of this paper. Those who
are interested, however, should refer to the sources listed in supra note 24.
27 See generally Steven H. Resnicoff, Physician Assisted Suicide Under
Jewish Law, 1 DEPAuL J. OF HEALTH CARE L. 589 (1997).
21 See generally Steven H. Resnicoff, A Commercial Conundrum: Does
Prudence Permit the Jewish "Permissible Venture"?, 20 SE'rON HALL L. REV.
77 (1990).
29 See generally SHIMON DURAN, TAsHBE'z 147; MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH
TORAH, Hilkhot Nahalot 6:11; YITZHAK WEISS, MINHAT YrrZHAK 1:233;
MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Hoshen Mishpat 2:49, 50.
3o MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1995). Most
jurisdictions have rules that parallel the American Bar Association's Model
Rule 1.2(d), which states, in part, that: "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent .... ." Note, however, that this rule does not specifically prohibit
an attorney from counseling a client to engage, or assisting a client, in non-
fraudulent conduct that is illegal, but not criminal. Interestingly, the
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American Bar Association's Model Code, stated that a lawyer shall not counsel
or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-IO(A)(7) (1994)
(Emphasis added).
It is not entirely clear why Model Rule 1.2(d) uses the word "criminal"
rather than "illegal," especially since Model Rule 3.4 refers to "unlawful,"
rather than "criminal" conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.4 (1994). It is possible that the change was to make it clear that it was
not forbidden for an attorney to advise a client to purposely breach a contract.
Nevertheless, it seems improbable that Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) would
have been construed to prohibit such advice. No reported case appears to have
sanctioned an attorney for giving such advice. Moreover, purposely breaching
a contract is unlikely to be regarded as "illegal." See Stephen L. Pepper,
Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and
Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995).
More probably, the change in language is to distinguish between violations of
criminal law and violations of discovery, tort, or regulatory law. See, e.g.,
ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, LMPC 61:701
(citing authorities). My colleague, Prof. Morrison Torrey, cited violations of
various provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as examples of
conduct that would be illegal but not criminal. Id. Prof. Pepper also cites
NLRA violations as examples. Id. at 1592. Thus, under the Model Rules, an
attorney might be permitted to advise a client to violate a labor law injunction
if the cost of compliance would exceed the cost of noncompliance without
violation Model Rule 1.2(d). Id. Other regulatory statutes similarly create
categories of unlawful, albeit not criminal, conduct. See, e.g., G. Robert
Blakely & John Robert Blakely, Civil and Criminal RICO: An Overview of the
Statute and its Operation, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 36 (Jan. 1997) (explaining that
section 1962 of the statute "states what is 'unlawful,' not 'criminal"' and
characterizing the statute as "primarily civil and remedial" rather than
"criminal and punitive" but not criminal); Mark L. Glassman, Comment, Can
HMOS Wield Market Power? Assessing Antitrust Liability in the Imperfect
Market for Health Care Financing, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 91 (1996) (pointing
out that the Clayton Act supplements the Sherman Act by making four
enumerated practices illegal, although not criminal"). But see Harris
Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis, U. ILL. L. REV.
53 (1993) (stating that Model Rule 1.2(d) should not be read as distinguishing
between criminal and other unlawful, but not criminal, acts. It is noteworthy,
however, that the Weinstein article does not mention that Model Rule 1.2(d)'s
use of the word "criminal" rather than "illegal" was a change from the
language of its predecessor, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) of the ABA Model
Code.
In addition, note that by using the word "knows" both Model Rule 1.2(d)
and Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) are inapplicable to instances in
14
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All Jewish law authorities should agree that in some situations it
would be strictly forbidden for a Jewish attorney to enable, advise
or assist a client to violate Jewish law, either because of the
biblical duty not to place a stumbling block in front of the blind
(Iifnei iver)31 or because of the rabbinic rule against assisting
wrongdoers (mesayeah) 2  One of the reasons for these
prohibitions is that it is improper for a Jew, who is supposed to
consider herself a servant of God, to help someone frustrate
God's Will.
33
A second aspect of these rules applies only where the
wrongdoer is Jewish. Judaism posits the existence of a special
interrelationship among Jews, pursuant to which each Jew, as
part of the Jewish community, is responsible for the conduct of
other members of the community. 4 Consequently, in many
situations, if a Jewish attorney is able to prevent another Jew -
including her Jewish client - from violating Jewish law, she is
obligated to take affirmative steps do so. 35  Similarly, if, by
rebuking a Jewish sinner, a Jewish attorney can convince a Jew to
mend his ways and return to God, the attorney is required to do
SO.36 The attorney certainly cannot encourage such a Jewish
which the suspicions that lawyers had did not rise to kmowledge. Jewish law,
by contrast, might prohibit an attorney from assisting a client even when it is
less certain that a client will violate Jewish law.
3! Leviticus 19:14. See AHARON IALEvI, SEFER HAHiNuKH, Commandment
232; SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 151:1, Orah Hayyim 347: (and
commentaries thereto). See also YrrZHAK ELIYAHU HAKOHEN ADLER, IFNEI
IVER (1988/89). Although none of these sources specifically discusses
attorneys, there is no doctrinal reason why it should be inapplicable to them.
The precise boundaries of this doctrine, as well as the rabbinic mesayeah
doctrine discussed next in the text, are subject to considerable controversy. A
detailed discussion of attendant issues awaits a subsequent article.
32 Id. SHULA ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 151:1 (and commentaries thereto).
33 See, e.g., MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Yoreh De'ah 1:3.
34See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, SEFER HAMrrzvoT, Afitrz'at Asei 205.
35 See, e.g., YrrZHAK WEmss, MNHAT YrIZHAK 5:14; EuEZER
WALDENBURG, TzITz ELIEZER XV: 15; MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE,
Yoreh De'ah 1:72.
36 See, e.g., MAmoNtDEs, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Deot 6:7. If a Jew
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client to violate Jewish law.37 For this reason, most, but not all,
authorities rule that Jews are not legally bound to stop non-Jews
from sinning. 38 Nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda HeHasid, a 12th
century authority, states: "If you see a non-Jew committing a
transgression and you can stop him, stop him. [After all,] God
sent [the prophet] Jonah to Nineveh to cause them [i.e., the non-
Jews there] to repent," 39  and at least one contemporary
commentator who denies that there is an obligation to prevent a
non-Jew from sinning acknowledges that "it certainly is morally
laudatory" to do so.40
On the other hand, there are contexts in which, according to
various authorities, the 1ifnei iver (enabling) and mesayeah
(assisting) doctrines may seem to be inapplicable. 4' In such
been successful, the Jew is considered as blameworthy as if he himself had
committed the violation. See also SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De 'ah 157:1.
For reasons beyond our present scope, if a person is intentionally sinning,
many authorities rule that there is an obligation to rebuke him even if it is clear
that the rebuke will be ignored. SHULHAN ARUKH, Orah Hayyim 608;
YISROEL MEIR HAKOHEN, MISHNAH BRURAH 608; MOSHE BEN AMRAM
GREENWALD, ARUGAT HABOSEM, Orah Hayyim 54. But see MOSHE OF
COUCY, SEFER MITZVOT GODOL, Mitzvah 11.
37 If the client would not commit the violation without the advice, the adviser
would violate the biblical ban against lifnei iver. See AHARON HALEVI, SEFER
HAHINUKH, Commandment 232. Even if the client would transgress Jewish
law anyway, providing encouragement would seem to be prohibited according
to many authorities. See, e.g., YITZHAK WEISS, MINHAT YITZHAK IV:79
(citing various authorities). As a practical matter, it may be extremely difficult
for an attorney to avoid offering words of encouragement at some time during
the representation of a client, even where the client is trying to violate Jewish
law.
38 But see Michael Broyde, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND JEWISH LAW 51
(Yeshiva Univ. Press 1996) (citing MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot
Melakhim 8:10; SHIMON DURAN, TASHBETZ 3:133; Menachem Mendel
Schneerson, HAPARDES 59:9 (5745), Sheva Mitzvot Shel Benai Noah).
39 YEHUDA HEHASID, SEFER HASIDIM 1124.
40 MICHAEL J. BROYDE, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND JEWISH LAW 61
(1996).
Some, for instance, may argue that providing assistance would be
permissible for a lawyer if the violator would commit the transgression even
without such help. Cf NAFTALI TzvI YEHUDA BERLIN, SHUT MEISHIV DAVAR
11:32 (where a person earns his livelihood from matchmaking, he may do so
16
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cases, what should a Jewish attorney do? It seems obvious that,
et ceteris paribus, a Jewish attorney still should not help a person
violate Jewish law because it subverts the Divine Will. Even if
the transgression would occur without her assistance, why should
she become a party to such an unseemly act? Among other
things, the bible (the Torah) explicitly commands Jews to "be
holy."42 In his famous commentary on this verse, Ray Moshe
ben Nabman, a leading 13th century authority, explains that the
concept of holiness involves separation from the mundane and
consecration to the Divine.43 He explains that one could follow
every letter of Jewish law and yet be spiritually repulsive (novel
birishut HaTorah). He interprets the commandment to "be holy"
as directing Jews to separate themselves from many types of
conduct that are literally permitted and to adopt practices that are
more spiritually pure. Thus, instead of relying on a literal
leniency and helping a client breach Jewish law, perhaps an
attorney should take a different client, whose goal promotes, or is
at least consistent with, Jewish values. After all, G-d grants each
person limited resources - physical, intellectual and emotional -
and, if a person recognizes that she is His servant, she should try
to maximize the morally positive result produced by those
resources.
Of course, all other things are rarely if ever equal, and there
may be special reasons why a Jewish attorney may feel pressure
to work on a matter even if the client's objective may violate
Jewish law.44  If so, what factors should be considered in
even if it involves what would otherwise be a violation of mesayeah). For
reasons I intend to develop in a subsequent article, I believe that the number of
cases indicating that one can be lenient on reliance that a client could succeed
with another attorney may be substantially exaggerated.
42 Levticus 19:2.
43 MOSHE BEN NA-MAN (NAHmtANDES), MtKROT GEDOLOT, Leviticus 19:2.
Nahmanides makes similar comments with respect to the biblical verse
directing Jews to do that which is "good and right." Id.; Deuteronomy 6:18.
" For example, the attorney may be an associate in a firm and rejecting an
assignment may endanger his prospects to become a partner. Even if the
attorney is already a partner in a firm or a sole practitioner, he may represent
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determining what to do?45 Three issues stand out: (1) the reason
why the enabling and assisting doctrines are perceived to be
inapplicable to the particular case; (2) the specific ways in which
the client's objective actually violate Jewish law; and, (3) the
reason why the attorney may want to represent the client.
The enabling and assisting principles may appear inapplicable to
a given situation for any of several doctrinal reasons. By
examining a precise reason, one can test its factual assumptions
and can identify other halakhic or practical problems that it could
engender. For example, assume as Hypothetical A that a Jewish
client (Client) whose goal violates Jewish law approaches a
Jewish attorney (Attorney). Assume that Client is not regarded
under Jewish law as someone who has abandoned Judaism 6 and
circumstances, the attorney may not want to risk the income stream such work
represents by rejecting this particular matter.
45 The text's use of the passive tense is intended to hint to the fact that, when
confronted with a Jewish law issue, religiously observant Jews often turn to a
Jewish law expert. As Boston University School of Law Professor Neil Hecht
once told me: "There is a technical term for such people. We call them
rabbis." In fact, not even everyone with the title rabbi is qualified to answer
questions as to all areas of Jewish law. Moreover, the Jewish law tradition
ideally calls for an individual to establish a personal relationship with one or
more expert rabbis who could then recommend which Jewish law approaches
would best suit the individual.
46 Some extremely important authorities rule that there is no obligation to
rebuke a client who is deemed to have totally abandoned Judaism. See, e.g.,
YISROEL MEIR HAKOHEN, BIUR HALAKHA 608, s.v. Aval; YEHIEL M.
EPSTEIN, ARUKH HASHULHAN, Orah Hayyim 608:7, and no rabbinic
prohibition against assisting transgressions by such persons if these violations
would have occurred even without the assistance. See SHABTAI HAKOHEN
(SHAKH), Yoreh De'ah 151:6, as construed, e.g., by MOSHE BEN AMRAM
GREENWALD, ARUGAT HABosEM, Orah Hayyin 54.
Nevertheless, the practical impact of this exception may be relatively small.
Many authorities argue that many modern Jews, because of the way they were
raised, cannot be said to have abandoned Judaism. As one commentator
states:
[A] person who has been brought up in a nonreligious environment
where he never had the opportunity to learn about Judaism, is like a
child who was abducted by gentiles, and is not considered to be
doing wrong purposely. Even if he is later exposed to authentic
Judaism, he is not to be blamed for rejecting it, since it is almost
18
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assume that, even if Attorney does not assist Client, Client can
prevail with the aid of a non-Jewish lawyer. Assume, further,
that Attorney is convinced she cannot persuade Client to abandon
his goal. A few Jewish law scholars conclude that, in such a
case, if Client purposely proceeds, knowing that his objective
contravenes Jewish law, Attorney can represent Client without
violating the enabling or assisting principles.47 Even if this view
were authoritative, which is subject to considerable doubt,48 it
would be problematic for Attorney to rely on her personal
impossible to overcome one's childhood upbringing. Therefore,
such a person is not to be counted among the nonbelievers, and he
should be approached with love and with every attempt to bring him
back to the teachings of our faith. [Citations omitted].
ARYEH KAPLAN, HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT II, 151 (1992). A number
of contemporary authorities indicate that many modem Jews, especially those
raised by non-Orthodox parents, should be considered to be such "child-
abductees." See, e.g., YISROEL REIS-.AN, THE LAWS OF RiBIS 98, n. 17
(1995) (citing Shimon Grinfield (Maharshag) and Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz
(Hazon Ish) for the rule that such non-observant Jews must be treated the same
way as Orthodox Jews regarding prohibitions concerning interest-bearing
loans). See also YEHIEL YAAKOV WEINBERG, SERIDEi EISH 11: 10; DAVID Z.
HOFFMAN, MELAMED LEHOYEL, Orah Hayyim 5; ZvI HIRSCH EISENSTADT,
BINYON TZIYON HEHADASHOT 23; MOSHE STERNBUCH, TESHUVOT
VIHANHAGOT, vol. 1, Orah Hayyim 132, 319, 363; CHAIM KOENIG, SHUT
HUKEI HAYYIM NISHMAT SARAH, vol. IV, Hoshen Afishpat 20 (citing
authorities); MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Yoreh Deah 11:52, Orah
Hayyim 111:46; IV:71. But see BINYOMIN YEHOSHA SILBER, AZ NIDABRU
IX:55; YrrZHAK WEISS, MINHAT YrrzHAK 111:79 (relying on the distinction
between observant and non-observant Jews to permit the purchase of goods
produced by non-observant Jews on the Sabbath, even when the purchase may
"cause" such non-observant Jews to work on the Sabbath); OVADIA YOSEF,
YABIA OMER 1I. Orah Hayyim 15; MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Orah
Hayyim V: 13(9).
47 See, e.g., YEHEZKEL LANDAU, DAGUL MERVAVAH, Yoreh De'ah 15 1:1.
Although some authorities agree with this view, most do not. EZRIEL
HILDESHEMER, SHUT RABBI EZRIEL I, Yoreh De'ah 182 (stating, at least as of
the seventeenth century that most of the Jewish law authorities disagreed with
Rabbi Landau). YrTZHAK WEISS, MINHAT YrzHAK 111:79 (stating, in the
twentieth century, that most authorities disagree with Rabbi Landau).
I See supra note 47. Even some authorities who agree with Rabbi Landau
contend that one should generally not, a priori, rely on this leniency. See,
e.g., MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHE, Yoreh De'ah 1:72, at 128.
19
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perception of her inability to dissuade Client from his intended
transgression. Under Jewish law, Attorney might be entitled - or
even required - to use various tactics, and, unless she in fact
attempts them, it may be difficult to accurately assess their
likelihood of success. In addition, Attorney's obligation to
dissuade Client is an ongoing one which would require Attorney
to continuously re-evaluate whether she could succeed. There is
an inherent risk that over time Attorney may forget to reassess
her ability to dissuade Client or, that as Attorney's own financial
interest in the case develops, her growing bias may cause her to
make an inaccurate assessment.49 Even if Attorney remains
aware of her Jewish law obligation to dissuade Client, it is
possible that, as a practical matter, her divided loyalties would
constitute a conflict of interests that would disqualify her under
secular law.5"
Assuming that Attorney were entitled to rely on the lenient view
that she could represent such a purposeful evildoer, there are
several additional, collateral problems which should at least be
mentioned. First, not only is a Jew prohibited from injuring
someone else, whether physically or financially, he is also
forbidden to cause such injury, even indirectly. Yet injuring an
adversary, at least financially, is often what a client wants - either
by getting a money judgment to which he is not entitled under
Jewish law or by being legally relieved of a valid Jewish law
of course, a problem of possible bias may arise from the outset because of
potential pressures to take the case. The problem, however, may become
exacerbated as time goes on because: (1) as the attorney-client relationship
develops, the attorney may in fact acquire an ability to influence the client to
modify (or even abandon) his demands; (2) as the attorney's personal interest
in the matter grows, she may become less able to objectively discharge her
Jewish law obligation from her ability to persuade.
50 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1996).
The American Bar Association Model Rule 1.7(b) states in pertinent part: "A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's own interests." Id. For example, effective
representation may require an attorney to provide a client with encouragement.
Yet Jewish law may forbid the attorney from providing such emotional support
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monetary obligation. As a result, even where the lifnei iver and
mesayeah doctrines do not apply, Jewish law may regard an
attorney who successfully assists such a client as someone who
has improperly caused injury to the clients adversary.5 Second,
an attorney often works very closely with her client for long
periods of time. This might violate the general rule not to
associate, especially on a close, ongoing basis, with
wrongdoers.Y By becoming accustomed to trying to help clients
violate Jewish law, the Attorney may become insensitive to the
importance of upholding Jewish law and may fail to rebuke other
clients whom she could, if she tried, persuade to abide by Jewish
law. Indeed, constant and intense interaction with wrongdoers -
many of whom may appear to possess good qualities and may be
"good clients" - could even tragically influence Attorney to be
less diligent in her own religious observance.53 Third, often an
attorney becomes identified with the client - in the eyes of her
adversary, the judge, the jurors and, in notorious cases, the
s" The prohibition against injuring another may be subsumed in the
prohibitions against stealing. See YAAKOV BLAu, PrrHEi HOSHEN V, Hilkhor
Nizikim 1:1(1) (citing authorities). Causing another injury may constitute a
biblical violation, even in instances in which the person who caused the injury
would not be civilly liable to pay for the injury. Id. See also EZRA BASRi.
DINEI MAMANOT 4:12, n.1. (arguing that although Jewish law authorities
disagree as to whether it is rabbinically prohibited to assist non-Jews to violate
Jewish law where they could have committed the violations without the help,
all authorities agree that it is forbidden to assist even a non-Jew to unlawfully
harm Jews).
52 See, e.g., MOSHE STERNBUCH, TESHUVOT VIHANHAGOT I, Ora Ha.vim
283; MENASHE KLEIN, MISNHE HALAKHOT 7:255. This rule certainly does
not preclude efforts to persuade wrongdoers to repent, especially if the person
making such efforts is especially gifted or trained for this purpose. It does,
however, generally apply to other types of close interaction and should
certainly apply to associations designed to assist a wrongdoer to violate Jewish
law.
51 STERNBUCH, supra note 52. Sternbuch cites the principle, Oy Lirasha, 0Y
Liskheno, which has several meanings. See generally, MISHNAH, Avot 1:7;
SHLOMO YrIZKAKI (RASH!), BABYLONIAN TALMiUD, Berakhot 48a; AVRAHAM
YrrZHAK KOOK, DA'AT KOHEN, Inyanei Yoreh De'ah 193. One of these
meanings is that, by associating with those who are spiritually corrupt, a
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general public. If the client is viewed as an evildoer, the attorney
may be similarly perceived. If so, by representing such a client,
an attorney could violate the directive to be "guiltless before God
and Israel," 5 4 which is construed not only as a commandment for
a person to act correctly but to be seen as acting correctly.55 If
by representing a wrongdoer, the attorney is perceived as acting
wrongfully, the attorney could violate the extremely serious rule
against causing Judaism to be ridiculed or God's name to be
desecrated, Hillul HaShem.
56
On the other hand, assume as Hypothetical B that Attorney is
unsure whether Client's purpose violates Jewish law. If Client's
version of what happened is accurate, Client may be entitled to
the relief he seeks. But Attorney is uncertain as to the accuracy
of Client's account - not because Attorney questions Client's
honesty, but, in light of other evidence Attorney has seen, she
thinks Client may lack the sophistication to really appreciate what
transpired. Assume that if Attorney does not assist Client, Client
can prevail with the help of a non-Jewish attorney. If so, even if
s Numbers 32:22.
5 See BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIME:
SOURCES AND COMMENTARY, VOLUME II 250-251 (1989).
56 Leviticus 22:32. See DONIN, supra note 3, at 43:
According to the Talmud, the very Sanctification of God's name and
the credibility of the religious life hinges, in fact, on the quality of
the ethical-moral life. If someone studies Scripture and Mishna, and
attends on the scholars, is honest in business, and speaks pleasantly
to persons, what do people then say concerning him? "Happy is the
father (and teacher) who taught him Torah, . . . for this man has
studied the Torah - look how fine his ways are, how righteous are
his deeds!" But if someone studies Scripture and Mishna, attends
on the scholars, but is dishonest in business and discourteous in his
relations with people, what do people say about him? "Woe unto
him who studied the Torah, woe unto his father (and teacher) who
taught him Torah! This man studied the Torah; Look how corrupt
are his deeds, how ugly his ways. (Yoma 86a). Id. For a
religiously learned or ritually observant person to act in a way that
would invite such remarks was regarded as a Desecration of the
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Attorney knew that Client were not entitled to the remedy sought,
most authorities would conclude that, by tadng the case,
Attorney would only violate a rabbinic prohibition and not
biblical law. As a general principle, Jewish law rules leniently as
to acts that only involve possible rabbinic, as opposed to possible
biblical, violations.57 Consequently, given that Attorney is unsure
whether Client's plan violates Jewish law at all, neither the
enabling or assisting doctrines would apply.58
If Attorney's doubt regarding the accuracy of Client's story is
reliable, Hypothetical B raises far fewer problems than
Hypothetical A. In Hypothetical B it is quite possible that
Client's success would in no way frustrate God's Will. In fact, if
Client is correct, helping Client prevail might fulfill God's Will.
In addition, it is possible that Client is not a wrongdoer and that
Attorney's identification with Client will not desensitize her to
her religious obligations and will not involve a desecration of
God's name.
The second issue, the specific ways in which a client's objective
actually violates Jewish law, is especially significant in light of
the Jewish law principle not to stand idly while another bleeds (o
ta'amod al dam re'ekhah). 9  Authorities interpret this biblical
directive as requiring one to affirmatively act to protect another
not only from physical, but also from economic, harm. Thus,
in Hypothetical A, where Client was a plaintiff who was
attempting in violation of Jewish law to financially harm the
defendant, the duty not to stand idly by might not only prevent
Attorney from representing Client, but might obligate Attorney to
17 The general rule is to be stringent regarding doubtful violations of biblical
law.
51 According to most authorities, the biblical lifnei iver doctrine does not
apply because the text assumes that even without Attorney's help, Client would
accomplish the transgression. The rabbinic mesayeah doctrine would not
apply because of the rule to be lenient in cases of doubtful violations of
rabbinic law.
'9 See Leviticus 19:16. See generally, Aaron Kirschenbaum, The Good
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try to help the defendant. The duty to save another from loss,
however, is not unlimited. For example, one person, A, is not
required to incur $100 of financial loss in order to save another,
B, from a loss of $100 or less. On the other hand, if, for
instance, Client was trying to violate Jewish law by obtaining an
order allowing him to terminate life support for a Jewish hospital
patient," Attorney may be obligated to try to help the patient
receive treatment even if in providing such aid Attorney would
endure a significant financial loss. 6
Because there are there are limits on the degree of financial
sacrifice one must endure to save a person from financial loss, it
is important to determine how much rejecting a case would cost
an attorney. Interestingly, Jewish law sometimes distinguishes
between the burden of expending money, which may excuse
certain action or inaction, and the "mere" loss of prospects for
future profit, which may not. It is unclear to what extent this
distinction will apply to decisions regarding the representation of
particular clients.
PART II - EMPLOYING QUESTIONABLE TACTICS
Assuming that representing a particular client would be
appropriate, Jewish law may still regulate how the Jewish
attorney practices. Indeed, a fundamental, and quite complicated,
issue arises as to the circumstances in which Jewish law allows a
Jewish attorney to be involved in secular courts and to subpoena
Jewish witnesses to testify.63 Moreover, serious questions exist'
as to whether Jewish law would permit an attorney to explain the
law to parties or witnesses whom she suspects will use the
61 See, e.g., Steven H. Resnicoff, Physician Assisted Suicide Under Jewish
Law, 1 J. DEPAUL HEALTH CARE L. 589 (1997).
62 This would presumably include a financial loss that might arise from a
malpractice suit brought by Attorney's client.
63 See, e.g., Michael J. Broyde, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND JEWISH LAW
(1996); Mordecai Biser, Can an Observant Jew Practice Law? A Look at
some Halakhic Problems, THE JEWISH LAW ANNUAL, Vol. Xl, 101-135
(1994).
' I hope to address these concerns in a subsequent article.
[Vol 15
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information to formulate effective lies, 65 to present evidence when
the attorney is unsure of its veracity, to argue the possibility of
alternative theories in which the attorney does not personally
believe, to utilize technical or formalistic arguments to enable a
client to avoid an otherwise valid obligation, to impeach the
credibility of a truthful witness, to embarrass a possibly truthful
witness, or to prompt an adversary to tell the truth by either
pretending to possess damning documentary evidence6 or by
having someone pose as a prospective witness who would
effectively challenge an adversary's lie. 67 A number of the
principles mentioned in Part I, such as novel birishut HaTorah,
Hiltul HaShem, and lo ta'amod al dam re'ekhah, may apply to
forbid or discourage some or all of these practices. Similarly,
additional Jewish law rules may be relevant, such as those that
prohibit oral oppression (ona'at devarim),6s tale-bearing, both as
to true tales (loshon harah)69 as well as to those that are false
(motzei shem rai),70 embarrassing people (hamalbeen pnei havero
birabeem)7y ' and deception (geneivat da at)7" and that require one
' Secular law codes generally permit an attorney to assume that a client, for
purposes of the legal representation, is honest, unless the attorney at the least
has very strong evidence and possibly until the attorney has knowledge to the
contrary. According to some commentators at least, Jewish law takes a very
different approach, permitting the giving of advice to a litigant only if there is
reason to believe that the client is honest and that the client's claim is just. See
BAsIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIMIE: SOURCES
AND COMMENTARY 99-106 (1984).
6 This sort of trick was used by Louis Nizer in his representation of Quentin
Reynolds who sued Westbrook Pegler for defamation. This litigation,
described in Nizer's book, MY LIFE IN COURT, was later made the subject of a
play and a made-for-television movie. Louis NIZER, MY LIFE IN COURT
(Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1961).
67 This was essentially the stratagem used by the character played by Tom
Cruise in the movie, A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.
1992).
6 Leviticus 25:17. See also Leviticus 19:33-34; Exodus 22:20-23. See
generally BABYLONIAN TALNUD, Bava Metsia 58b.
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to be honest (hein tzedek)73, to pursue justice (tzedek, tzedek
tirdo)74 and to distance oneself from falsehood (medevar shekker
tirhak).
75
Ironically, in some ways, Jewish law may be more restrictive of
lawyers than applicable American law, while being more
permissive in other ways. This may be substantially explained by
two major differences between the Jewish and American legal
systems. First, the American legal model76 is adversarial, in
which the parties and their representatives actively present the
evidence and argue the case to a relatively passive trier of fact,
while the historical Jewish law model is inquisitorial,' 7 in which
the trier of fact is actively involved in the elicitation of evidence
and examination of witnesses. The American adversarial model,
rightly or wrongly, places great emphasis on the client's ability to
rely on her attorney's loyalty. Although the precise extent of
these secular rules vary from one jurisdiction to another, a client
is the beneficiary of fiduciary duties owed by her attorney, is
entitled to confidentiality (even as to information that may harm
others),78 and can, in some instances, fire her attorney without
72 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Hullin 94a; MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH,
Hilkhot Mekhira 18:1-4.
73 Leviticus 19:36; MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Mekhira 7:8.
7" Deuteronomy 16:20.
71 Exodus 23:7.
76 Interestingly, some European secular legal systems employ an inquisitorial
model.
7 Frimer, supra note 2, at 297.
78 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). Although the
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("ABA Model
Rules") do not, per se, have the effect of law, by now most states have
patterned their own legally binding rules after them. ABA Model Rule 1.6, in
part, states that:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
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incurring the legal liabilities that would accrue from firing other
"employees." 79 Because of its inquisitorial model, Jewish law for
a long time resisted the use of attorneys.WO Although attorneys are
now accepted, Jewish law never adopted rules giving a client
greater rights as to her attorney than she would have as to other
employees or agents.
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm.
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer...
Id.
Many states have adopted different versions of this rule (sometimes requiring
and sometimes permitting more disclosure than the ABA rule), and some states
have specific statutes that may require disclosure in certain specific contexts.
Examination of the ABA rule is nonetheless instructive. According to this
provision, a lawyer could not reveal information relating to representation of a
client even if disclosure were necessary to save someone from imminent death
or substantial bodily harm if such death or harm were not going to be the
result of the "client's criminal act." Id. Thus, if it would be the result of
someone else's act or of the client's act, but not from the client's "criminal"
act, the exception in (b)(1) would not apply. Id. Indeed, it seems clear that
the exception is inapplicable even if death would result from the client's
criminal act provided that the death was not an "imminent result." In any
event, there certainly is no exception where the harm to the third party is
financial. Depending on how flexibly courts wish to construe "substantial
bodily harm," there may be no exception where the injury, albeit serious, is
emotional or psychological. Moreover, the word imminent seems to modify
"substantial bodily harm" just as it modifies "death." After all, "death" is
more serious than "substantial bodily harm," and if the exception only applies
to prevent imminent death, it seems that it would apply only to prevent
imminent substantial bodily harm.
Jewish law's approach is quite different. See, e.g., Gordon Tucker, The
Confidentiality Rule: A Philosophical Perspective ith Reference to JeWsh
Lav and Ethics, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 99 (1985). See also Russell G.
Pearce, To Save a Life: Why a Rabbi and a Jewish Lan.yer Must Disclose a
Client Confidence, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1771 (1996).
79 See, e.g., Bella v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991). But see,
e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
See generally Damian Edward Okasinski, Annotation, In-House Counsel's
Rights to Maintain Action for Wrongful Discharge, 16 A.L.R.5TH 239 (1994);
Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Update on In-House Counsel's Right-to-Sue, SCO8 ALI-
ABA 1471 (July 17, 1997).
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Nor do applicable secular ethics rules or customs directly allow
Jewish attorneys to cut ethical corners. There are indigenous
Jewish law principles that, in some contexts, permit secular law
and commercial custom to affect people's monetary rights and
obligations. 8' Nevertheless, they do not directly affect non-
monetary duties, such as the duty not to stand idly by while
another - even your client's adversary - is harmed in violation of
Jewish law8" or the duties not to deceive or oppress. Thus, the
secular duty to zealously represent one's client would not allow a
Jewish attorney to use methods, even if permitted under secular
law, that violate Jewish law standards regarding deception and
oppression.
The second major distinction is that Jewish law focuses on the
need to achieve justice in each case, while American law focuses
more substantially on process. 3 To promote process, specifically
its adversarial process, American law compromises on justice in
individual instances, such as by requiring an attorney to withhold
See generally Steven H. Resnicoff, Bankruptcy Law - A Viable Halachic
Option?, 24 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'Y 5 (Fall 1992).
82 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also text associated with and
immediately following supra notes 59-62 (noting that the scope of a person's
Jewish law obligations depends on their attendant financial burdens). By
imposing additional burdens, such as through the creation of secular causes of
action for violation of fiduciary duties or establishment of a standard for
determining malpractice, secular law or commercial custom can indirectly
affect one's Jewish law responsibilities.
83 It must be noted, however, that Jewish law does set forth some procedural
requirements of its own. In many instances these are construed as being
biblically required. Rabbinic authorities disfavor the creation of additional
loopholes, in part because of the obligation to "eliminate the evil from your
midst," which appears in many biblical verses. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 13:6,
17:7, 19:19, 21:21, 22:21, 22:24, 24:7. See generally Hershel Schachter,
Dina Di'Malchusa: Secular Law as a Religious Obligation, 1 J. HALACHA &
CONTEMP. SOC'Y 103 (1981). Cf. HANINA BEN-MENACHEM, JUDICIAL
DEVIATION IN TALMUDIC LAW: GOVERNED BY MEN, NOT BY RULES (1991).
In addition, it is critical to point out that this essay focuses on the restrictions
Jewish law may impose on Jews practicing secular law generally, not on the
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confidential information even if such non-disclosure enables an
innocent party to be wrongfully harmed.'
Because Jewish law concentrates on accomplishing justice in
individual cases to a greater extent than American law,8 Jewish
law more often has to struggle with the thorny decision as to
when important ends can warrant questionable means.8 As
already mentioned, Jewish law posits various prohibitions against
deceit. In a number of contexts, Jewish law nevertheless permits
limited deception if the goal to be effectuated is sufficiently
importantY Consequently, those interested as to whether, in
particular scenarios, Jewish law would allow the types of tactics
identified at the beginning of Part II need to consult with an
experienced Jewish law expert who can analyze primary Jewish
law sources.
' See supra note 78. Some may try to argue that confidentiality is also an
ethical issue. Perhaps this might be true in the present context in which clients
arguably rely on the fact they are told that their confidentiality will be
relatively inviolate. It is not at all clear that there is any ethical mandate for a
rule that, in the first instance, entitles clients to such confidentiality. As a
separate matter, however, it must be acknowledged that some commentators
may argue that the purpose of the secular law compromise is to further justice
indirectly, because they believe that, overall, the adversary system is more
successful than its alternatives at achieving justice.
I Some, but not many, secular ethics rules are also the product of a
balancing of process versus justice. Thus, there are some exceptions to the
secular confidentiality rules. See supra note 78.
' Given the diversity of values held by different Americans, it would be
difficult to agree how to resolve the issue of whether a particular goal justifies
certain methods. Moreover, secular regulation is not predicated upon any
basic assumption that people will want or try to comply in good faith. DePaul
Prof. Jim Colliton, a colleague who teaches tax law and who formerly worked
for the Internal Revenue Service, once commented that he thought that most
attorneys approach the ethics code the same way as they approach the tax
code; they look for every technical loophole they can find. As a result, secular
law generally recognizes a need to facilitate enforcement of some basic, bright
baselines - such as a blanket prohibition against intentional misrepresentations.
87 See AARON LEvINE, ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY AND JEWIsH LAW 86
(1993) (discusses opinions of various Jewish law authorities as to whether a
job applicant can engage in apparently deceptive conduct to dispel a
prospective employer's unreasonable concerns).
29
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Even if Jewish law would theoretically permit the
aforementioned tactics in a particular case, such use may still be
disfavored because of the Jewish law belief that a person's
character is influenced by his actions (nifal lifie pe'ulotov).,8
Thus, according to a number of authorities, several rules against
deception are designed to protect a prospective deceiver from the
negative spiritual impact of deceiving and not merely to protect
parties from being deceived.8 9 It is possible that this negative
effect could even occur when an act is specifically required by
Jewish law. The Torah discusses the possibility that most of the
inhabitants of a Jewish city could become idolaters. 90 In such a
case, G-d commands that all of the people in the city be put to
death. 9' Immediately after this discussion, G-d promises the
Jewish nation that he will bestow mercy upon them. Rabbi
Hayyim ben Moshe Attar explains the juxtaposition of these
verses.
He states that the natural effect of executing capital punishment
on all of a city's inhabitants, although done pursuant to G-d's
commandment, would ordinarily be to develop the trait of
cruelty. 9 G-d therefore provides a special promise that the nation
will be protected against this natural phenomenon. It is uncertain
whether the same protection is afforded in other contexts.
This concern may also help explain a rarely stated Jewish law
rule, halakha vin'an morin kain, which means "this is the legal
rule, but one should not teach people it." 93 Thus, Jewish
authorities discuss a tragic situation in which non-Jews have
surrounded a group of Jews and issued an ultimatum that unless
the group turns over a specific person, they will kill the entire
88 AHARON HALEvI, SEFER HAHINUKH, Commandment 16. Jewish literature
seems to express this concept in several ways. For example, the sages report
that once someone repeats a certain transgression, he becomes desensitized to
the fact that the action is forbidden (shana vihutra lo).
'9 MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot De'ot 2:6; ELIEZER
WALDENBURG, TzrTz ELIEZER XV: 12 (citing Rebbenu Yonah).
90 Deuteronomy 13:15.
" Deuteronomy 13:16.
9 See OHR HAHAYYIM, MIKROT GEDOLOT, Deuteronomy 13:18.
9 See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah 5:5.
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group of Jews. Maimonides explains that "[i]f the specified
person in fact deserves capital punishment, such as Shiva ben
Bikhri, the group can turn the person over - but do not a priori
teach them that this is the law."94 Perhaps part of the reason why
this law should not be taught, even though the lives of all of the
group's members are at stake, is because of the deleterious effect
such an action would have on the moral sensibilities - on the
holiness - of the members of the group themselves.
CONCLUSION
Jewish law has much to say about how one may practice secular
law and speaks not only through mandate and proscription, but
also through encouragement and discouragement. Jewish law's
affirmative duties and prohibitions should not be studied in
isolation from its many other, more graduated, guidelines. Yet as
a practical matter, Jewish lawyers exist in a secular environment
which, because of its emphasis on the attorney-client relationship
and the adversary process, exhorts attorneys to represent clients
irrespective of the moral repugnance of their causes and trains
them to employ techniques that, at least in individual cases, are
not designed to reach a just result - or a result that complies with
Jewish law. This ambience operates to deaden a Jewish lawyer's
sensitivity to Jewish law obligations and aspirations.
The Mishnah, around which Talmudic discussions revolve,
states that a person should teach his son a profession that is
"clean and easy" (nikiyah vikalah).95 This expression can be
construed as referring to an occupation that is relatively free from
Jewish law complications.' Although much good can be
9 id.
95 MIsHNAH, Pirkei Avot 1:6.
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accomplished by Jewish attorneys, not all forms of secular
lawyering satisfy this condition.'
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